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News of the Month
Yanukovych-Barroso meeting “productive” but no results
President Viktor Yanukovych met with the President of the European Commis-
sion, Jose Manuel Barroso, on 13 September, as part of Mr. Yanukovych’s work-
ing visit to Brussels at Mr. Barroso’s invitation.
The main topic of their discussions was to confirm the Ukraine-EU agenda and 
the progress of negotiations on the Association Agreement. The greatest num-
ber of unresolved points remains in that part of the Agreement related to setting 
up a Free Trade Area. At the wrap-up press briefing, Mr. Yanukovych noted: 
“We need a Free Trade Area that reflects the economic realities of both sides 
and that will benefit both European and Ukrainian producers.”
In general, the President of Ukraine reiterated Ukraine’s drive towards Euro-
pean integration: “Integration into the EU is our path to the future.” He also em-
phasized the success of negotiations with the President of the European Com-
mission and declared himself “satisfied with the results.” Mr. Barroso was more 
cautious and characterized negotiations as “very productive.”
Given concerns about the progress of these talks on the Association Agreement 
between Ukraine and the EU spelled out in a joint letter from the Foreign Min-
isters of Poland, Czechia and Sweden to their Ukrainian counterparts, the meet-
ing in Brussels looked like an attempt to “reboot” mutual relations. The vague 
phrasings of both politicians suggest that, at this time, no specific understanding 
was reached. Still, given the duration and political significance of these negotia-
tions, shutting them down at this point would not be acceptable to either side.
Kyiv and Astana intensify cooperation
President Yanukovych met with the President of Kazakhstan, Nursultan Naz-
arbayev on 14 September, during the latter’s working visit to Kyiv. The two 
sides reported on a number of declarative understandings regarding economic 
cooperation between Ukraine and Kazakhstan. A joint statement by Mr. Yanu-
kovych and Mr. Nazarbayev mentions the development of transport corridors 
that, according to the Ukrainian President, will “join” Europe and Asia. Another 
project appears even more ambitious: linking up marine transport routes be-
tween the Caspian and Black Seas.
In the energy sector, the two Heads of State reached more concrete agreement, 
especially as regards renewing the transit of Kazakh crude across Ukrainian ter-
ritory and increasing its annual volume to 8 million t. At the same time, carrying 
out these projects depends entirely on Russia’s position. Ukraine and Kazakh-
stan have no mutual borders, so without including Moscow, most of the agree-
ments between Kyiv and Astana are likely to remain only on paper.
Stopping negotiations 
would not be good  
for either side
Without Moscow, most 
plans between Kyiv  
and Astana will remain 
on paper only
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Tax Code re-run
Ukraine’s Cabinet of Ministers submitted an amended draft Tax Code to the 
Verkhovna Rada on 21 September. First reading of the Code passed in the Verk-
hovna Rada back in June, but roused a storm of criticism from business and vot-
ers alike. This forced the President to announce that the Code in that iteration 
could not be approved.
The Government has now removed a number of the most criticized provisions 
from the Code, including some that considerably expanded the powers of the 
State Tax Administration. Deputy Premier Borys Kolesnikov described the 
Code as “one of the most liberal tax codes in Europe.”
One-time chair of the State Entrepreneurship Committee Oleksandra Kuzhel 
was less enthused, stating that the proposed Tax Code is “destructive” for both 
small and medium businesses.
The absence of public consensus over specific provisions in the new Tax Code 
in the run-up to local elections makes it less likely that it will be swiftly adopted 
by the Verkhovna Rada. Moreover, the President has already stated that he is 
prepared to veto the Tax Code if it is “unpopular.”
Lack of public consensus 
means this Tax Code  
is not likely to pass
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Eurointegration: Reset
The illusion of eurointegration
Ukraine’s integration into Europe is into a dead end. For reasons that ordinary 
Ukrainians do not understand, the European Union is not exactly refusing 
Ukraine entry, but it is also not making any commitments of any kind. This is a 
matter of open discussion, both among Ukrainians and in the Union, but no one 
is brave enough to say that the Emperor has no clothes and to admit the obvious 
unreality of European integration for Ukraine today.
What’s more, the situation is deteriorating daily. Both in Europe and in Ukraine, 
people see the need to re-boot relations, but no one seems to know exactly how 
to do that. Each fresh attempt to resolve the problem ends up looking exactly 
like all the previous steps that led to this very situation.
Ukraine’s commitments remain strictly on paper. The gap between the endless 
trail of reports and the virtual reality of cooperation on the ground grows larg-
er and larger. European bureaucrats, who love nothing better than to write up 
their achievements, and European consultants, who cannot allow themselves 
to admit honestly how meaningless their projects are lest they lose their jobs, 
contribute in equal measure to this. No one is prepared to write about the unre-
alistic nature of their plans and how little they correspond to real capacities on 
the ground in Ukraine.
Ukraine’s integration into the EU is little more than an imitation today. More-
over, it is bad both for Ukraine and for the Union. On the Ukrainian side, it 
fosters and finances corruption in government offices, while in the European 
Union it is a con and a waste of taxpayer money.
“European integration is key priority for Ukraine,” President Yanukovych de-
clared in Brussels, the same words that have come from Ukraine’s previous 
presidents and other top officials. It is clear that, for Ukrainians, European inte-
gration and membership in the EU are one and the same thing, and the Associa-
tion Agreement is seen as the only path that will undoubtedly bring them to it.
In the Union, by contrast, these are clearly two separate things. The Association 
Agreement, which is becoming more and more of a sacred cow for Ukrainian 
politicians, is only one instrument for approaching the EU. This process is not 
limited in any way to the geographic borders of Europe, but is a series of con-
centric circles expanding across the entire globe. Moreover, its main purpose is 
to establish a common platform for cooperation built on European principles.
Ukraine’s integration into 
Europe is in a dead end
Ukrainians equate 
European integration 
with EU membership
Topic of the Month
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Ukraine and the EU  
have different ideas  
of European integration
Ukraine effectively has no idea what it is doing when it sits down to the negotia-
tion table with the EU. There is an enormous difference between what Ukraini-
ans see as Eurointegration and how the Europeans apply this concept in prac-
tice. If the reality is that the two sides see these processes and their outcomes so 
totally differently, then little can come of any joint efforts.
The illusion of EU expansion
EU expansion is a nice diplomatic term that has no bearing on reality and cov-
ers completely different processes. In fact, expansion is not on the table at this 
time. All the processes that found their beginnings in 1952 when the Coal and 
Steel Union was formed have been nothing more than the return of Europe to 
its historical boundaries, which had been carved up after World War II. This 
process continues to this very day and will come to its natural conclusion once 
the Balkans join the Union.
Europe is not expanding 
but returning to its 
historic boundaries
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Russia’s position sees 
Ukraine as separate from 
the rest of Europe
Neither Ukraine, with its current borders, nor Turkey, which became an official 
accession candidate in 2005—after 40 years of getting there—, were part of pre-
war Europe.
As the heir of the Soviet Union, Russia has publicly taken on itself responsibility 
for the post-soviet region and is determined to continue to see this region as its 
own geopolitical “sphere of influence.” Its hardened position and military reach 
separate Ukraine from the rest of the European world even better than did the 
Iron Curtain.
The absence of a geopolitical center and geopolitical thinking in the EU and 
the dependence of EU leaders on national political realities have made it impos-
sible to consider any re-think of the current division of territories according to 
the centers of power. In effect, the balance and relationship of forces in Europe 
differ little from what they were 60 years ago.
Speaking different languages
All the EU’s efforts show that the Union’s real agenda vis-а-vis Ukraine is to main-
tain status quo. It seems that, for the EU, the best situation would be for Ukraine 
to continue to balance on the edge between Russia and the European Union.
On one hand, the EU has let Ukraine know that it is not seen as a potential 
member of the European community. On the other hand, it keeps repeating, 
“The doors are open” like a mantra. There’s not a single official document that 
clearly establishes the EU’s Ukraine agenda, yet this does not in any way mean 
that the EU has no position on this.
Some interpret this as the EU’s intention to turn Ukraine into a buffer zone—an 
approach that has a historical basis and is typical of all superstates of the inte-
grational model, to which the EU undoubtedly belongs. Europe has been apply-
ing this model since Roman times, when it signed treaties with its neighbors in 
order to protect its borders from barbarian invasions.
The European Neighborhood Policy resembles more the attempts of the Roman 
Empire to get barbarians to guard its own borders. The list of countries that the 
EU’s foreign policy projects include make it amply clear that Ukraine has no 
chances of eurointegration.
Another cornerstone in Ukraine’s eurointegrational ambitions—and a major 
stumbling block in its negotiations with the EU—is the prospect of a visa-free 
regime. Here, again, concepts are confused, as a visa is a migrational instrument, 
not an element of integrational policy. The best proof of this is the fact that citizens 
of Turkey, which is an official candidate for accession to the European Union, as 
well as citizens of Albania and Bosnia&Herzegovina who are only potential candi-
dates, still largely need to obtain visas, while citizens of the US, Canada, Austra-
lia, Japan and most Latin American countries can enter freely without one.
The EU is working  
to maintain status quo
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At the moment, Ukraine does not even have a clear signal about the prospects 
that its citizens will be able to travel into the EU without visas. In the process 
of negotiating, the long-awaited “roadmap” to the introduction of a visa-free 
regime has degenerated into yet another “action plan.” The difference it not 
really that big, but it is significant: a roadmap leads to a specific goal, while an 
action plan, as Ukrainians have learned, generally leads nowhere.
While negotiators keep knocking heads over the issue of visa-free travel, Euro-
pean migration policy has moved in another direction. The Visa Code that came 
into effect in April 2010 is unanimously seen by European politicians as one that 
will ensure Ukrainian citizens a particularly favorable procedure for crossing 
European borders. Still, all those who have felt how it works on their own skins 
are of a different opinion and are critical of the EU for having made stricter an 
already severe restrictions and requirements for obtaining visas.
If the visa issue is the top of the EU migration policy tree, its roots are the Re-
admission Treaty that came into effect at the beginning of 2010. In contrast to 
the EU’s completely uncommitted prospects of canceling visas for Ukraine, 
Ukraine has taken on itself very specific commitments to take back all illegal 
migrants who crossed into the EU through its borders. Given the virtually trans-
parent borders and the lack of a reciprocal treaty with Russia, Ukraine is likely 
to become a migration net into which anyone who wants to can swim, but with-
out any options for where to go further. Ukraine has the world economic crisis 
to thank for the fact that this net is currently not bursting to the gills with migra-
tional flotsam from all over.
EU (Schengen) visa lists
EU member states
Special visa-free provisions (Schengen treaty, OCT or other)
Visa required to enter the EU – annex I countries
Visa required to enter Schengen area and for transit through Schengen area
Visa-free access to the EU for 90 days – annex II countries
Visa-status unknown, listed neither in annex I nor in II
Ukraine has no clear 
signal about  
the dropping of EU visa 
requirements
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Opponents of European integration in Ukraine are talking about a “Turkish 
scenario” taking place. The EU does not think of Turks or Ukrainians as Euro-
peans, but is obliged to maintain the integrational process with our countries. 
Possibly in this way, it hopes to prevent both countries from being drawn into 
some rival sphere of influence, say, an Islamic one for Turkey and a Russian one 
for Ukraine, and to make a buffer zone out of them instead.
Technically, a buffer is a country is not part of any integrated entity but associ-
ates with them. Still, no country can realistically remain a buffer zone for long. If 
one center of power does not take it in, it is likely to go to the other one: Turkey 
is now drifting towards Islam and Ukraine is drifting towards Russia.
But this kind of situation is just what the European Union neither needs nor 
wants, as it is a potential security nightmare. The Roman Empire collapsed be-
cause it was unable to establish relations with surrounding peoples, but the EU 
seems to have forgotten that already. Europe, like Russia, is turning Ukraine 
into a time-bomb, and one that will inevitably blow up. Ukraine must either be 
a threat or a part of the European world.
The real sick man of Europe?
Since the times of Leonid Kuchma, Ukraine has tended to have a two-headed 
form of eurointegration: the declarative one on paper and the real one. To hear 
Ukraine’s leaders speak and to read Government documents, the impression 
is that there is no more determine country to join the EU on this planet. Still, 
if a sick man complains for nearly 15 years about his illness but does nothing 
to actually treat it, the question arises immediately whether he is not more at-
tached to his disease than to good health. For Ukraine’s governments, creeping 
eurointegration has become a chronic disease.
The reason why eurointegration has failed in Ukraine is not just because the EU 
wants the country to permanently stay somewhere in the middle of the path. 
Internal factors have also contributed more than a little to this process becom-
ing an endless effort to reach a disappearing horizon. The most obvious barrier 
to europeanizing Ukraine is the unreformed soviet system of public administra-
tion.
Europe’s institutional occupation has transformed the countries from the soviet 
camp into EU member states. If a country has no state institutions other than 
those that function according to European standards, its government, business 
and citizens are finally forced to start playing according to new rules.
From the very start of its independence, the situation in Ukraine has been ex-
actly the opposite: all its institutions remain soviet in their essence to this day. 
Government, business and voters also have little choice but to adapt themselves 
to the existing system.
Opponents of the EU 
talk about a “Turkish 
scenario” taking place 
with Ukraine
Ukraine is either  
a threat or part  
of the European world
Creeping eurointegration 
has become a chronic 
illness for every 
government
A broken down soviet 
government system 
is a major obstacle to 
eurointegration
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In nearly 20 years of independence, Ukraine’s soviet government machine, that 
is the system of interaction between government, business and individual citi-
zens has mutated to such an extent that it has lost the capacity for totalitarian 
rule. But this mutated public administration system has not been able to be-
come democratic and in line with European norms and standards, because no 
one was systematically introducing these.
Ukraine’s europeanization needs radical changes. Government and business 
have both adapted to the current state of affairs. But they both also understand 
that, without europeanization, Ukraine cannot succeed economically or politi-
cally.
The illusion of Association Agreements
The EU would like Ukraine to be a reliable, consistent partner. But this is pos-
sible in a democratic country that is rebuilding its internal and external policies 
along European lines. 
What Ukraine’s present and past governments have seen as a key component 
of eurointegration policy, the Association Agreement, is actually only an instru-
ment for cooperation that the EU has been developing with a large number of 
both close and distant countries. If this kind of twisted logic is followed to its 
conclusion, then Mexico, Israel and North Africa are way ahead of Ukraine on 
the path to Europe, as they signed their Association Agreements with the EU 
back in 2000!
The EU currently has Association Agreements or their equivalent with 25 coun-
tries. Another 14 Association Agreements are at various phases of the negotia-
tion process, including the one with Ukraine. The reason why the European 
Union uses this instrument so broadly is that it cannot lose with them. In fact, by 
signing such an agreement, the two sides commit themselves to playing by the 
same European rules.
Opponents of eurointegration are very clear about the threat that an Associa-
tion Agreement carries for Ukraine. The format of the Agreement, especially as 
regards the functioning of the Free Trade Area, only specifics the broad-based 
expansion of European norms. In the case of Ukraine, this is supposed to be 
“deep and all-encompassing.” Depending on the overall world situation, this 
can be both convenient and otherwise both politically and commercially. But it 
is always convenient for the EU, where companies gain access to new markets 
on their own terms.
Meanwhile, few people in Ukraine are talking about the fact that the reason for any 
threats related to the institution of European standards lies not in the standards 
themselves, but in the institutional incapacity for Ukraine to adopt them. The way 
Ukraine’s government bodies are operating today, there is no point in expecting 
any Association Agreement with the EU to be properly carried out. Should the 
Government and business 
both know that Ukraine 
cannot succeed without 
europeanizing
The EU has AAs with 
25 countries and is 
negotiating with 14 more
Ukraine is not ready  
to undertake an AA  
with the EU
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status quo be maintained after the signing of such an agreement, the Government 
will have serious trouble organizing its execution. The main problem areas are:
Lack of a centralized coordination mechanism
Ukraine still lacks a single coordinating unit for European integration policy. At 
the moment there is a series of separate processes in individual government bod-
ies that often operate in parallel. Most aspects of eurointegration policy are co-
ordinated by the Economy and Justice Ministries and the Cabinet Secretariat.
Individual coordinating functions are established in law and are effectively car-
ried out by more than one body. When this kind of duplication takes place, the 
entire system of coordination becomes ineffective and no one takes responsibil-
ity for specific problems or failures.
If this kind of situation remains in eurointegration, the Government will not be 
able to ensure effective communication and coordination among CEBs both 
during the development of the National Program for the implementation the 
AA and during its execution.
Inability to properly plan the AA execution process
The current Government planning system, especially strategic and budget 
planning makes it impossible to make use of such management instruments as 
the National Program for the implementation the AA based on procedures and 
templates used by all the countries that have executed or are executing similar 
agreements with the EU.
Ukraine has myriad planning procedures and templates, especially for budget 
programs. In their structure they are completely in line with best European prac-
tice. However, the lack of standards and quality control means that the goals of 
these programs are not related to problems and problems with decisions, while 
funding goes to measures that will never help reach the established goals. Instead 
of budgetary provision to carry out the country’s development priorities, this in-
strument has turned into a plan for spending public funds by the main handlers.
Lack of capacity among CEBs
Today, Ukraine’s CEBs are not clearly assigned the specific objectives that they 
need to achieve in order to successfully carry out programs and plans regarding 
integration into the EU, nor is it established what products they are supposed 
to develop.
At the same time, their internal structure gets in the way of carrying out such 
objectives and preparing the necessary products. It is anything but clear who 
will be responsible for the individual products that will be necessary during the 
preparation phase and the execution of the National Program for the imple-
mentation the AA. Moreover, often the same functions are handled by several 
sub-units, none of which is responsible for the end product.
Inside Ukraine #11, September 2010
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Democracy = freedom to live, not to steal
The europeanization of Ukraine is the point where Ukraine’s interests and those 
of the EU coincide. Ukraine absolutely needs European norms and standards in 
order to reform the public administration system and ensure its own function-
ing democracy in daily life.
Joining the European Union is, for ordinary Ukrainians, the only opportunity to 
be free and wealthy. Ukrainians are so determined about eurointegration that 
no President will be able to ignore no matter how much pressure is exerted.
Ukrainians want the freedom to live, work, be politically engaged, travel around 
the world, and decide where they want to live. All this was impossible in the So-
viet Union. Everybody understands that only freedom spurs initiative, whether 
it be commercial, social or spiritual. Countries that live in democratic environ-
ments have an immeasurably higher quality of life, education, healthcare and 
public services.
The kind of political system that ensures the freedom of every individual and 
their well-being is called democracy. The essence of democracy lies in the es-
tablishment of strict control over all common resources—both financial and 
natural—, over the state apparatus, over politicians, and over all those posts 
that control the gateways to state, that is, national common resources.
In all totalitarian countries, where the government has been objectively and in-
evitably usurped by embezzlers, democracy is presented as something terrible 
and threatening to the national interest, as something that “does not suit the na-
tional mentality.” Totalitarian regimes without free economic competition are 
never highly developed. At least, the world has not seen such examples.
Ukraine’s freedom and democracy depend on its foreign policy. Integration 
with the current regime in Russia or integration with the European Union is a 
question of quality of life for Ukraine.
Integration with today’s Russia, in which the repressive systems of a totalitarian 
form of government are being restored, will inevitably bring these same princi-
ples to Ukraine. There will be no chance for sustainable long-term development 
with such an integration. The country will never build an effective public ad-
ministration system and it will be impossible to modernize the two economies, 
no matter what politicians say.
There is a very real and important reason why people in Russia or Ukraine might 
think that democracy does not suit them and does not work. Our countries have 
so far only experienced political freedom with the institution of democratic or-
der, democratic oversight and democratic state institutions.
For Ukrainians, joining  
the EU is the only option 
for being free and well-off
Integration with Russia  
vs the EU is a choice  
of quality of life  
for Ukrainians
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The failure to work at establishing democratic state institutions has led to a situ-
ation where political and economic freedom that were brought by Boris Yeltsin 
in Russia and by Viktor Yushchenko and Yulia Tymoshenko in Ukraine also led 
to a freewheeling state apparatus, whose absolute lack of oversight led to total 
corruption. Uncontrolled, unrestricted by strict laws that punish for any vio-
lations of norms and human rights, the government machine was transformed 
into an army of marauders.
In the battle of ideas at the World Bank in the 1990s, the theories of Jeffrey 
Sachs won out. These promoted shock therapy, that is, total liberalization with-
out concern for building institutions, which were supposed to develop on their 
own. Had his rival, Joseph Stiglitz won out, all technical assistance would have 
gone to establishing market and democratic institutions and there would not 
have been the chaos and disillusionment that both Ukrainians and Russians 
have had to struggle with.
Vladimir Putin and Viktor Yanukovych appeal to voters who are desperate for 
social order and discipline. Neither one nor the other has anything but soviet 
experience behind him, when it comes to public administration. For them, order 
means a single top-down chain-of-command, which is called the executive.
What neither Ukraine nor Russia know is that, in a democracy, freedom and 
competition are meant for politics and economics. Freedom and liberalism in-
side the government machine are completely inadmissible. Democracy, on the 
contrary, means that there is a strict executive chain-of-command, a strict hier-
archy, subordination, and severe, immediate consequences for not carrying out 
orders and procedures.
Today, Ukraine’s bureaucrats steal while voters accuse the President of corrup-
tion. This is certainly not democracy. Democracy means free elections, the right 
of the individual to freedom of speech and of confession and the rule of law. The 
guarantor of these rights is the President.
Ukraine’s problem is not political freedom, as Ukrainians earned it. Ukrainians 
want a European freedom to live, that is, to live free and well-off, and democ-
racy, which relies on appropriate public administration.
Needed: Institutional transformation
Relations between Ukraine and the EU are currently in a state where there is no 
way out in the current model of simulated European integration. Rewriting old 
promises and commitments will go nowhere.
Opponents of eurointegration point to the threat that Ukraine will become a 
buffer zone for the EU. This risk lies in the very geographic location of the coun-
try, between the EU and Russia. For that very reason, Ukraine needs EU assis-
Freedom and liberalism 
within the state apparatus 
is unacceptable
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tance in embodying European principles of integration in the Eurasian region. 
The key condition here is a strong and democratic government machine.
Ukraine needs no promises about membership from the EU. It needs help trans-
forming the soviet government machine into mechanisms that function accord-
ing to European standards and are capable of ensuring the necessary quality for 
Ukraine to be a reliable EU partner.
Russia may protest against Ukraine getting closer to the EU, but it is hard to 
imagine it dictating to Europe what kind of technical assistance should or 
should not be granted to Ukraine. The focus of foreign aid needs to be democ-
ratizing the government machine. This will make it possible to separate political 
integration from the form of technical assistance.
Ukraine’s President and Government have clearly stated their intentions to pre-
serve the eurointegration course. Obviously, they are primarily concerned with 
seeing concrete results from this process and not virtual prospects for Ukraine. 
This realistic and grounded view could help transform the Association Agree-
ment from a half-measure designed to maintain status quo into a platform for 
reform.
Ukraine needs to see a change in thinking about who controls whom in the 
country: the state controls the people and business or the people and business 
control the state through a system of state oversight institutions. The key re-
quirement for this is to institute European principles of anti-corruption legisla-
tion, where violations are clearly established in every norm and every violation 
is clearly tied to a specific penalty.
The European Union is being irresponsible towards those countries that have 
maintained an unreformed public administration system from their totalitarian 
past. Helping democratize the government system without overseeing the re-
sults is more harmful than good.
Although the EU has no obligation to offer Ukraine membership, it does have a 
duty before its own citizens and before the global democratic community to sup-
port democratization in Ukraine. Yet the EU keeps talking about Ukraine’s lack 
of capacity, which Europeans call “unwillingness to carry out commitments,” 
and has never raised the question why Ukraine does not carry them out.
The EU cannot allow itself not to think what is going to happen on our common 
European soil in the future. It has no right to shrug off the obligation to support 
democratization, as this is a crime against our common future.
Support for democratization and thinking about democratization, including in 
Ukraine is an EU duty. The EU has the experience, skills, knowledge and habits 
necessary to transform undeveloped countries into democratic and economi-
cally developed ones. The assistance it provided to candidate countries in ac-
Ukraine needs EU help 
transforming public 
institutions, not promises 
of accession
The AA could be  
a platform for reform
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ceding to the EU is an excellent example of the role of EU assistance as a cata-
lyst for the transformational processes of democratization.
Still, this is not happening with Ukraine. Despite the fact that over 1991-2010, 
just the national component of financial instruments for cooperation between 
Ukraine and the EU, through TACIS and the ENPI, have cost nearly EUR 1.385bn 
in EU aid, the carrying out of numberless aid programs has only substituted for 
the idea of reform and imitated lively reformist activity, presenting results that 
are mostly wishful thinking. Ineffective aid is actually damaging to Ukraine, as 
it fills in the vacuum created by the lack of reforms with a pointless process of 
executing aid programs that cannot possibly reach their declared goals.
The fundamental difference lies in the approaches and instruments to provid-
ing assistance. Countries who were candidates for accession were given aid 
whose primary focus was on building up state institutions and developing infra-
structure with a clear understanding that further funding depended on concrete 
results.
The EU: There are none so blind
Ukraine has had access to international consultants who mostly developed 
reform policy recommendations without considering the likeliness that these 
recommendations could or would be put into practice. In other words, to coun-
terweigh advice, conferences and brief study tours, the EU’s arsenal includes 
experience instituting national professional development systems to establish 
new standards of working in various fields and drafting state policy documents 
according to democratic standards.
Until now, Ukraine was the only one constantly blamed for the lack of reforms. 
Yet, some part of the blame lies also with the EU. Demanding that Ukraine carry 
out reforms that were never operationalized in aid programs to match the level 
of capacity in state institutions to carry out reforms was the same as demanding 
that a first-grader solve a physics problem from a grade seven textbook.
Even the launch of the Budget Support program as a new form of assistance 
under the ENPI in 2007 has not changed the situation. The EU continues to 
stubbornly ignore the unreformed state of Ukraine’s government institutions, 
giving them hard cash for the Budget despite the fact that Ukraine does not 
meet EU criteria for allocating this kind of assistance. In this way, the Union 
shifts responsibility from itself onto Ukrainians. Yet, until the EU actually helps 
Ukraine reform its corrupt soviet system of state institutions, no systemic re-
forms will be possible.
Ukraine understands all the political conditions and restrictions in the EU’s po-
sition towards it today and it knows that membership is quite unrealistic under 
these circumstances. So all efforts need to be directed towards changing these 
circumstances.
The EU has some 
responsibility  
for the absence  
of reform in Ukraine…
…turning a blind eye 
to Ukraine’s inadequate 
fundamentals
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So, the first condition for europeanizing Ukraine is to form democratic insti-
tutions of public administration to replace the current mutations of the soviet 
administrative machine.
The second one is to normalize relations with Russia and move them onto the 
path of civilized integration according to European norms. Such a constructive 
and pragmatic position on the part of Ukraine will make it possible to ease ten-
sions in relations with the EU and to move them from the level of allusions, 
omissions, and unfulfilled commitments to consistent cooperation directed at 
building up the Eurasian region along EU principles.
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Europeanization means 
democratic governance 
and active cooperation 
with Russia following 
European standards 
